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1. BACKGROUND
It is hornbook law that a trust will not be permitted to fail for
want of a trustee; the courts will supply one if the grantor does not.
This may suggest to some that the trustee is a relatively insignificant
figure in the trust. Realistically, though, the selection of the trustee
is one of the most important decisions of the grantor, for the trustee
must fill the grantor's shoes and carry out his intentions. In states
like Texas, where the trustee typically has broad powers and no
judicial supervision, it is even more vital that the right kind of person
be chosen. Yet the choice is often routinely handled by grantors and
their attorneys. This article is designed as a guide to intelligent
selection of a trustee.
The trustee may be an individual, a corporation, or a combination
of these serving as co-trustees. A corporate trustee is usually a bank
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having trust powers,1 and the individual is normally a friend, rela-
tive, attorney or business associate. The individual professional trus-
tee is often found in larger Eastern cities but seldom elsewhere.
Nonetheless, some Texas lawyers, accountants and others serve as
trustees frequently enough to be at least semi-professional.'
So far we have assumed that the selection of the trustee is the
settlor's decision. Frankness dictates recognition that this is not
always true. The idea of the trust may have been sold to the settlor
by a bank, accountant, lawyer or insurance agent in a package which
already included a trustee. For purposes of further discussion we
assume that this has not happened, and that the choice of the trustee
is a matter for deliberation. The lawyer has an important function
in advising the settlor in this respect, as in others relating to the
trust.
The intelligent selection of a trustee involves careful consideration
of the entire nature of the trust. While it is easy to draw up a list
of qualities for a good trustee (it sounds like a Boy Scout oath),
generalities will not do the job. There is no universal formula for a
trustee any more than there is a universal form for a trust instrument.
We turn then to some of the useful criteria for selecting a trustee,
starting with the more general and moving on to those related to
particular types of trusts. Later we consider tax factors.
The next section of this discussion proceeds on the assumption
that there will be only one trustee. This makes it easier to isolate the
relevant qualities. Often, however, the argument becomes unneces-
sarily polarized. As we conclude in sections III and IV below, it is
See note 6 infra. From 1919 to 1961, Texas corporations with trust powers but without
banking privileges could be formed under the general corporate laws, i.e., without the
capital requirements and state supervision of regular bank and trust companies. Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 1302(49), 1303b (1945); Gordon v. Lake, 356 S.W.2d 138 (Tex.
1962). This was no longer true after 1961 when the general corporate laws superseded by
the Texas Business Corp. Act were repealed; see Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.01 (B) (4) (b)
(1956). However, previously formed "1302(49) and 1303b" trust companies did not lose
their existence and could continue to exercise their powers. Op. Att'y Gen. (Tex.) WW-897
(Aug. 2, 1960). The repealer stated that it did not "impair or otherwise affect . . . the
organization or the continued existence of a domestic corporation existing at the time of
such repeal . . . provided that any corporation heretofore operating by virtue of ["1302(49)
and 1303b"] must meet the qualifications of the Texas Business Corporation Act." Texas
Acts 1961, ch. 229, § 2. The meaning of the proviso is far from clear. It may require that
trust powers be given up by such corporations. Or it may merely mean that they must
bring their internal corporate procedures into line with the Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. The latter
view is more consonant with the cited Op. Att'y Gen., and has been adopted by Op.
Att'y Gen. (Tex.) WW-1508 (Dec. 20, 1962). Assuming this is the correct view, old
"1302(49) and 1303b" corporations may be acquired to serve as trustees where a con-
trolled, low-capital corporate fiduciary is desired. They remain subject to the normally mild
supervision of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1524a (1962).
An attorney who agrees to serve as trustee should be aware of possible conflicts of in-
terest. For example, in an inter vivos arrangement, his professional duty to his client (the
grantor) may clash with his fiduciary duty to the trust and its beneficiaries.
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frequently desirable to have two or more trustees combining the
characteristics desired. The reader should keep this in mind as he
moves through the next section.
2. CRITERIA FOR SELECTING A TRUSTEE
2.1 General Criteria
(A) Legal There are surprisingly few legal restrictions on the
choice of a trustee. It may even be that he need not have capacity
to contract, and thus might be an incompetent or minor.' Obviously,
an incompetent is ruled out on practical grounds, and a minor usually
will be. More importantly, a wife can be a trustee despite coverture.'
Non-resident citizens can be used, although their remoteness may
present physical complications, and perhaps double state taxation.'
Domestic corporations can serve if they have trust powers or pur-
poses! In addition to the usual banks and trust companies,' non-profit
corporations often act as trustees of trusts within their charitable,
educational or similar provinces.' Foreign corporations may have to
qualify locally before they can act' and are usually reluctant to do
a 57 Tex. Jur. 2d 502 (1964) so states without supporting authority. Contra, I Scott,
Trusts 697-98 (2d ed. 1956).
'McAdams v. Ogletree, 348 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Frint
v. Tate, 162 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
'See Greenought v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947) (because one trustee lived in
Rhode Island, its intangibles tax applied to stock owned by the trust, although the other
trustee, the stock certificate and the trust administration were all in New York).
' Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 351 (1858). Except as indicated in note I supra,
the only corporations now expressly permitted to have trust purposes or powers in Texas
are national banks, and state banks and trust companies all organized with substantial capi-
tal and subject to considerable supervision and regulation. 12 U.S.C. § 248(k) (1964)
(national banks); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 342-301 (c), (d) (1959) (state banks),
1513a, § 2 (1962) (state trust companies).
See note 6 supra.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1396-2.01.A (1962) lists a non-exclusive variety of
purposes for which non-profit corporations may be organized. Coupled with general powers
to hold property, invest and contract, and incidental powers to carry out their purposes,
art. 1396-2.02.A, these should amply support their capacity to be trustees for their pur-
poses. A specific but narrow power to hold property in trust for certain affiliated organiza-
tions, art. 1396-2.02.A(16), may create some negative implication. On the other hand, the
authorization to call the governing body either a board of directors or a board of trustees,
art. 1396-2.14, adds some indirect support to the trust concept. Non-profit corporations have
been recognized as trustees in other states; see 1 Scott, Trusts 717 n.2 (2d ed. 1956); Jones
v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174 (1883). An agreement with a nonprofit corporation is illus-
trated by Form H in the Appendix.
We understand that at least one probate court declines to appoint nonprofit corporations
as guardians within the general scope of their corporate purposes. The premise is that art.
1513a, note 6 supra, must be complied with. The same article covers trustees as well as
guardians, although the largely nonjudicial operation of trusts in Texas makes it unlikely
that the question will come up in the same way.
'See Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 8.01B(11) for certain local activities of a foreign
trustee which do not require local qualification; Michigan Trust Co. v. Turney, 36 S.W.2d
787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref. (allowing attorney's fees for services to local ancillary
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so because of the consequent susceptibility to local taxation and
service of process. 0 Alien individuals or corporations meet legal bar-
riers to property ownership," which normally make them ineligible.
Apart from tax problems" there is nothing to keep the grantor
from being the trustee," and he is often the logical choice. The Texas
Trust Act specifically provides that a beneficiary may be the trustee
of a testamentary trust 4 and a co-trustee of any trust." The negative
implication is strong that a beneficiary cannot be the sole trustee of
an inter vivos trust.' There are tax problems here too.'
(B) Practical and Personal Administering a trust is a complicated
operation" and requires many talents. Foremost among these is prob-
ably sound judgment. This includes getting relevant information and
advice and acting wisely and firmly on it. An indecisive person may
be paralyzed by a trustee's heavy responsibilities. Others, ordinarily
prudent, may become reckless in handling someone else's property.
Usually, though not always, a grantor will want a trustee who is
impartial" and not swayed by favoritism or the personal persuasions
of a beneficiary. A fortiori, it is questionable to make a beneficiary
a trustee with power to prefer himself over other beneficiaries.
Financial responsibility is desirable in a trustee, since there is reason
to believe that more skillful and careful administration will be given
administrator of local assets where foreign corporate trustee failed to qualify). In general,
see Administration of Out-of-State Assets by Corporate Trustees, 103 Trusts & Estates 997
(1964); Annots., Eligibility of Foreign Corporation to Appointment as Executor, Administra-
tar or Testamentary Trustee, 65 A.L.R. 1237 (1930); Eligibility of Foreign Corporation to
Appointment as Trustee of Inter Vivos Trust, 82 A.L.R.2d 946 (1962).
"A fairly common and generally acceptable alternative is to name as trustee for local
assets an individual who is an officer of the foreign corporation. See Casner, Estate Planning
1160-61, 1654 (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1964).
" See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 166-67 (with some exceptions, aliens cannot ac-
quire legal or equitable interest in Texas land), 177 (an alien has in Texas only such rights
to personal property as his country gives to United States citizens). These were repealed in
1965 with a statement that aliens shall enjoy the same property rights as citizens. Tex.
Laws 1965, ch. 61, 2 Vernon's Tex. Sess. L. Serv. 146 (1965).
1" Section 2.3 infra.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-7.A (1960) expressly permits this.
14 Id. at 7425b-7.C. By saying that he may be "a beneficiary," the act suggests that he
may not be the sole beneficiary.
"sId. at 7425b-7.F.
"0 Without benefit of statutes like those cited in the two previous notes, the case law
doctrine of merger would probably operate to the extent that legal and equitable interests
were in the same person; the doctrine is apparently preserved where a beneficiary is the only
trustee of an inter vivos trust. If one of several beneficiaries were sole trustee of an inter
vivos trust, there would probably be only a partial merger (i.e., of his interests), and the
trust would remain valid for the other beneficiaries.
17 Section 2.3 infra.
"3 For example, see the elaborate procedure in Texas Bankers Ass'n Trust Section, Texas
Trust Operations Manual (1960 with Supp. 1964). Many trusts can be handled more simply.
9 A corporate trustee does not automatically qualify. For some of the conflicts of in-
terest to which corporate trust personnel are exposed, see Harris, Code of Ethics for Trust-
men, 103 Trusts & Estates 1186 (1964).
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by a trustee who has accumulated assets of his own and knows they
are at some risk of liability for his misconduct. A bond" offers some
protection, but the attendant costs and restrictions usually make it
undesirable. A bond is certainly no substitute for integrity and hon-
esty in the trustee. If the grantor is not willing to have a particular
trustee without bond, he probably does not have enough confidence
to name him trustee at all. Nevertheless, the possibility of future
disloyalty should be weighed against the trouble and expense of a
bond.
Experience is a valuable attribute of a trustee, although it need
not be experience in trust administration if it is experience relevant
to the particular trust. For farm assets and operations, a farmer may
be a better trustee than a city bank. However, trust experience is
extremely valuable because of the skill and insight developed. Closely
related is knowledge of what to do and how to do it. Business, in-
vestment, tax, legal, accounting and other aspects are involved here.
However, the trustee need not have it all himself if he knows what
he needs and how to get it from those who have it. An intelligent
individual, adequately advised, can serve quite as well as an experi-
enced institution, and perhaps more economically and flexibly.
Facilities are necessary for bookkeeping, safe handling of securi-
ties and other trust matters. As with knowledge, it is not essential
that the trustee have the facilities himself, so long as he can command
them when needed. Thus a part-time accountant and a safe deposit
box will suffice in some situations.
Permanence and continuity are important to any trust, and moreso
to the longer ones. These factors appear to weigh heavily in favor of
the corporate trustee. Yet, closer examination reveals that, while the
corporation has legal continuity in theory, its operational continuity
in fact depends on succession of individual officers and employees.
Personnel turnover can be disruptive in a corporate trustee just as
with individual trustees. The problem is likely to be more acute in
a small trust department than in a larger one. In most cases the
corporate trustee compensates for turnover by having several persons
familiar with each account, and by collective experience, precedents
and information. Individuals are seldom able to match this. But it
should be realized that succession is always a need. In one sense, the
question is whether the succession is to be provided by the grantor
"5 Bonding is required unless waived by the trust instrument. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 7425b-25 (L) (Supp. 1964). Corporate trustees are generally exempt from this require-
ment.
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(through names and procedures) or by the management of the cor-
porate fiduciary.
Along with permanence, the trustee should have adaptability.
Needs, circumstances and techniques change with time, often radical-
ly. The trustee must know when and how to change with them.
The trustee must be conscientious and loyal in the highest degree.
His position is full of responsibility. Unless he can and will carry it
out devotedly, he is not the man for the job."' To sum up in a sort
of tautology, the trustee must be trustworthy; the grantor must trust
him as well as entrust property to him.
(C) Cost Texas is one of the relatively few states without statutory
patterns of compensation for trustees.2 Consequently, different trus-
tees may make different charges, and it behooves the trustor to com-
pare and consider them. Other things being equal, he will want the
lowest possible costs in this respect. 2
Corporate trustees used to have fairly uniform charges, often pub-
lished. They were probably not as uniform in fact as in appearance
because of concessions through bargaining. As a result of an anti-
24trust scare, less information is published, and fee formulas are more
varied. However, the actual charge is likely to be about the same at
most institutions in a given locale. In our experience, the common
figure is around one-half per cent of assets per annum, a little higher
on the first $25,000 to $50,000, and rather lower on assets over
$500,000 or $1,000,000. However, in some localities, the fee may be
a percentage of income without regard to asset value. To some extent,
21 Considerations of this sort are occasionally used to disparage corporate fiduciaries; their
pressures to operate profitably may result in efficient but rule-of-thumb procedures. See,
e.g., Shattuck & Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook 147 (2d ed. 1953). For an example
of the pressure, see Ferguson, Trust Department Profits-At What Expense?, 102 Trusts &
Estates 1173 (1963); Ferguson, Trust Profits-Agony and Ecstasy, 104 Trusts & Estates
905 (1965).22 See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 975 (2d ed. 1962) for a review of the statutes in
other states. See Bogert, supra at pp. 352-58 for prevailing charges of trust companies in
various cities.
" Reasonable fees are deductible in computing the trust's income tax. Treas. Reg. §
1.212-1(i) (1961). Until 1965, trustees' commissions for distributions of corpus were
chargeable against corpus in trust accounting; all other trustees' compensation was charge-
able against income. Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 7425b-36A, B (1960). By virtue of a
1965 amendment, all trustee's compensation is chargeable against income, principal or par-
tially against each, as the trustee shall in its discretion determine to be "just and equitable."
Ibid. (Supp. 1965).
24 United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, Trade Cas. 5 71,020 (D. Minn. 1964);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, Trade Cas. 5 71,021 (D. Minn. 1964); United States v.
Duluth Clearing House, Trade Cas. 5 71,022 (D. Minn. 1964). See United States v. Hunt-
erdon County Trust Co., Trade Cas. 5 70,263 (N.D. N.J. 1962) (consent injunction against
fixing uniform service charges; first anti-trust case on bank charges). None of these cases
involved trust fees, but banks naturally became skittish about all their charges. The situation
was brought home to Texas by a grand jury investigation of Dallas banks; see N.Y. Times,
Jan. 3, 1962, p. 39, col. 1; Jan. 5, 1962, p. 39, col. 1. No indictment resulted.
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fees are negotiable, particularly for good customers of a bank. In
addition, it is sometimes possible to obtain a commitment as to future
fees, e.g., for a testamentary trust at the time the will is drawn.
Attorneys, accountants and other individuals may serve for the
same sort of fee, or for an hourly charge (usually comparable to
their professional rates), which makes the total cost much less pre-
dictable. In all instances it is important to find what services are
covered by the designated charge and what will be extra, e.g., initia-
tion and termination, legal services, tax services, accounting services,
real estate or oil property management, etc.
Relatives, beneficiaries, business associates, or close friends will
often serve without compensation. Such an arrangement should be
weighed carefully to see if the trustee will give the trust the para-
mount attention it will need, or will follow the natural tendency to
slight it for more remunerative matters. Free services, many lawyers
would admit, are worth just about what is paid for them. Moreover,
expenses may be incurred by individual trustees for accounting or
other services which would be covered by an institution's fee. While
there is no necessary correlation between a trustee's charges and his
abilities, the settlor should keep in mind that the usual corporate fees
are small relative to the losses that might result from inept adminis-
tration.
2.2 Criteria Related To The Particular Trust
There are many more variations in trusts than we can list here;
we attempt to treat only the more prominent differences and the
effect they may have on the selection of the trustee.
(A) Inter Vivos v. Testamentary Because an inter vivos trust typi-
cally comes into effect at once, the grantor is in a better position to
choose individual trustees and (to some extent) supervise their con-
duct. However, tax limitations operate rather severely." Many of
these tax limitations do not operate in the selection of testamentary
trustees, although a few of them do." The grantor, by hypothesis,
is no longer on the scene when the testamentary trust begins to
function, so he must have even greater faith in the trustee. Moreover,
it may be many years between the drafting of the will and the com-
mencement of the trust, so that named individuals may no longer
be available or suitable. In a testamentary trust there is an obvious
advantage in having the same person as trustee and as executor;
25 Section 2.3 (B) infra.
26 Section 2.3 (A) infra.
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coordination is simplified and continuity is maximized. Similarly,
with pour-over trusts a common fiduciary is desirable.
(B) Term of the Trust In general the shorter the term of the trust,
the broader the possible choice of trustees. Less administration is re-
quired, and fewer changes are likely to occur in the trust or the
trustees. Thus, a two-year inter vivos charitable trust under section
673 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code makes far fewer demands on
a trustee than a three-generation testamentary trust. The need for
continuity and investment skill is much less. In appraising the term
of a trust one must realize the risk of speculating on life expectancies.
While statistically accurate, they can be individually misleading. The
ailing octogenarian whose life measures the trust may live to be 110.
(C) Discretion Given the Trustee At one extreme, the trustee may
be directed to distribute all income to a single beneficiary and have
virtually no discretion. At the other, he may have wide discretion
to accumulate income or to distribute it (or corpus) in unequal
portions among several beneficiaries. Contrary arguments can be
made in these situations. Some would urge that the corporate trustee
is better suited for the former and the relative or close associate for
the latter because of his acquaintance with and understanding of the
individual beneficiaries and their problems and needs. Others would
insist that the corporate trustee, because of its impartiality, is better
suited to deal with the complex situation. The special problems of
giving a beneficiary discretion over distributions have already been
mentioned.27
(D) Purpose of the Trust A charitable trust may find its most
suitable trustee in someone actively associated with the particular
charity." Similarly, the logic of a voting trust designed to consoli-
date control of a group of shareholders will usually compel that the
trustees be principal shareholders. On the other hand, a voting trust
designed to relieve someone from a legally-prohibited control will
call for a highly independent trustee.8 An alimony or child support
trust would be nonsense if the grantor were the trustee.
(E) Assets of the Trust Institutional trustees are reluctant to hold
unincorporated business interests (proprietorships or partnerships)
27 Section 2.1 (B) supra. See also 2.2 (H) infra.
2A conventional trust may be less efficient than a gift to an existing charitable organi-
zation with instruction to retain corpus as an endowment and spend only income. If no suit-
able charitable institution exists, one may be created for the purpose, usually more simply as
a corporation than as a trust. Thus trust results can be achieved without the formality of a
separate trust. See also note 8 supra, on nonprofit corporations as trustees, and Form H in
Appendix.
" See Comment, Voting Trusts in the Airline Industry, 31 J. Air L. & Com. 133 (1965).
1965]j
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
because of possible liabilities. If the trust is to include such an interest,
and the grantor wants it held for an extended period, the use of an
individual trustee may be dictated." He will usually be a business
associate or partner, to take advantage of special familiarity with and
involvement in the business. Real estate typically requires expert
management. However, there will be cases where this is not true,
say a property under net lease to a highly rated tenant for a term
extending beyond the life of the trust. Stocks and bonds call for
considerable supervision, although this can be had through invest-
ment advisers or mutual funds (quite economically for those which
charge no sales load).
The size of the trust corpus and its yield are plainly relevant. For
a very small trust the minimum fees of corporate fiduciaries may be
prohibitive; the same may be true of a trust with low income pro-
duction if fees are based on assets. At the other end of the scale, a
very large trust may be able to operate more economically with its
own staff and an individual trustee than with a corporate trustee.
In this connection it is important to keep in mind that the longer
the trust lasts, the more changes there are likely to be in assets, size
and yield. Planning on the basis of the immediate situation may be
very poor for the long run.
(F) Desired Investment Policy Closely related is the matter of in-
vestment policy. Corporate trustees have a reputation for conserva-
tism in this respect. Often this will be just what the grantor wants.
If it is not, he should seriously consider another kind of trustee who,
short of recklessness, will follow a more adventurous investment
31
course.
Common trust funds of corporate fiduciaries are an efficient way
of obtaining diversification and intensive supervision of investments.
Indeed, except for fairly large trusts, few other methods of diversi-
fied investment are likely to be economical. While such collective
administration is attractive, the grantor should realize that there may
be an extra cost, since withdrawals on termination or other distribu-
0 One alternative is to convert the interest into a limited partnership interest for holding
by the trust. Another is to incorporate, although this may have drawbacks. These are far
more acceptable to the typical corporate fiduciary.
31 Corporations creating profit-sharing and pension plans for their employees must es-
tablish trusts for the plans to obtain maximum tax benefits of qualified deferred compensa-
tion arrangements. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a); Rev. Rul. 61-157, Part 2(b),
1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67, 70. But corporate management typically wants to maintain control
over investments of the trust. This is commonly done by providing for a committee whose
investment decisions are binding on the trustee. See Note, Trust Advisers, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
1230, 1239 (1965), commenting also on the fiduciary status of such advisers, and the vari-
ous forms their powers may take. Such committees are often given discretion over other as-
pects of the trust, e.g., the method of distributon to beneficiaries.
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tions of corpus are taxable transactions. 2 Moreover, most of the
advantages of common trust funds can be had from mutual funds
(particularly those few which have no sales load), with the added
attraction that the shares (like any other shares held directly by the
trust) can be distributed to beneficiaries without precipitating a
tax.3 The compulsory recognition of gain on withdrawals from
common trust funds puts them at a disadvantage relative to other
trusts, and the more successful the investment experience is, the
greater the disadvantage.
(G) Geography Location is a factor in designating the trustee.
Despite rapid communications it will rarely be desirable to have a
trustee distant from the principal trust properties or from the prin-
cipal beneficiaries. How much distance is tolerable is another of those
value judgments that must be made in view of all the circumstances.
Geographical considerations may lead also to a provision in the trust
instrument for change of trustee when a principal beneficiary moves
permanently to a new location, although this is likely not to be
worth the added expense and complication.
(H) Psychology Closely related to the practical and personal quali-
ties discussed in 2.1 (B) above are the psychological dimensions of
the choice of a trustee. Obviously, a grantor is asking for trouble if
he names a trustee toward whom beneficiaries are already hostile.'
Even without prior hostility, beneficiaries sometimes become resentful
of a trustee. This may be because they were not chosen for the posi-
tion-it does signify special confidence, and perhaps love, by the
grantor-or because they dislike the power (real or imaginary) that
the trustee has over them. And it is easily intensified where the
trustee symbolizes the "dead hand," as in a tight testamentary trust.
From another angle, making an individual (beneficiary or not)
a trustee can be constructive for him, fulfilling a natural desire for
stature and control. (If the desire exceeds natural bounds, the warn-
3int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 584(e); Treas. Reg. 5 1.584-4 (1963).
a The general rosle is that a distribution of trust corpus is a gift or bequest from the
grantor, and thus nontaxable. However, the distribution becomes taxable as a sale or ex-
change if it is in satisfaction of a pecuniary obligation or bequest. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-
4(a)(2) and (3) (1957).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether a trust should be formed in a
particular case. However, the factors just discussed in the text prompt one observation along
this line. If the grantor's plans call for limited discretion, intangible assets and routine in-
vestments, he should examine non-trust devices which produce somewhat similar results,
e.g., (a) life insurance with settlement options including annuities or installment payments;
(b) similar arrangements often available under employee pension and profit-sharing plans;
(c) conventional or variable annuities, perhaps with joint-and-survivor features; (d) mutual
funds with systematic accumulation and withdrawal plans.
'See, e.g., In Re Mathues' Estate, 185 AtI. 768, 322 Pa. 358 (1936).
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ing light should flash.) A trusteeship can provide a sense of purpose,
especially in cases of great wealth, where a beneficiary might other-
wise become a parasite. But the trustee is a sort of father figure and
often a family counselor. If he is psychologically ill-equipped for
these roles, the trust, as well as the trustee, may suffer. The same will
be true if he is also a beneficiary and unable to perceive and fairly
resolve the resulting conflict of interest. Conflict with the grantor
can also result, particularly if the trustee-beneficiary is (for tax pur-
poses35) given powers to benefit the grantor which are "adverse" to
the beneficiary's own interest.
Corporate trust personnel are typically too detached from the
beneficiaries to generate problems of the kind just mentioned. But
they are also too detached for the formation of any very positive
relationship, although they are professionally sympathetic."
We are not urging grantors and lawyers to become amateur psy-
chiatrists; this is much too risky. But the considerations suggested
here are within the grasp of intelligent, observant men accustomed
to dealing with others. They may help prevent serious personal suf-
fering.
2.3 TAX CRITERIA
More often than not, a trust has important tax objectives. These
include minimization of income and estate levies on the grantor and
on the various beneficiaries. These objectives operate through certain
familiar tax principles. For example, the income of a trust is gen-
erally taxed to the beneficiaries so far as it is distributed (or required
to be distributed) to them, and taxed to the trustee (as a separate
taxpayer ) so far as it is not. Taxes can be saved by diverting in-
come from the grantor, who is typically in a high tax bracket, to
beneficiaries or trustees who are in lower brackets. Savings increase
if the income can be discretionally channeled to the particular bene-
ficiaries or trustee in the lowest brackets. (It is always open to ques-
tion whether such maneuvering is sound family planning, as opposed
to tax planning, but that is another matter.) Similarly, in general,
one is estate-taxed only on property he owns at death. Therefore, a
person with substantial property can avoid estate tax by giving it
away before he dies, and, if it continues to be held in trust, no tax
is due on the death of a beneficiary or trustee.
3 See § 2.3 (B) (1) infra.
" For problems seen by the industry in attitudes toward corporate trustees, see Stayer,
Public Image of a Corporate Trustee, 102 Trusts & Estates 552 (1963).
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Tax minimization objectives can be achieved only by careful com-
pliance with intricate rules designed to tax the real owner, identified
by the enjoyment and control of the property rather than by legal
title. Thus it is widely understood that the objectives can be destroyed
by faulty dispositive provisions, like the grantor's retention of a
reversionary interest." It is not so widely understood that they can
be equally destroyed by other powers or interests in grantors, bene-
ficiaries or third persons. Such powers and their allocation can ma-
terially influence the choice of a trustee. In general, the more remote
the trustee is from grantor and beneficiary, the more power he can
hold without adverse tax consequences, but this is not always true.
Moreover, the rules are not the same for income and estate taxes, and
different considerations apply to inter vivos and testamentary trusts.
The results are confusing, to say the least. In most instances the
alternatives are: (a) a closer trustee, broader powers and higher taxes,
(b) a closer trustee, narrower powers and lower taxes, and (c) a
more remote trustee, broader powers and lower taxes. There is no
uniformly easy solution to this three-way conflict among trustee
choice, trust flexibility and taxation level. We turn now to the details
of the problem, looking first at testamentary and then at inter vivos
trusts. Under each, we consider both income and estate tax conse-
quences. We make no attempt to cover the whole field of trust taxa-
tion but only those parts affecting the trustee's selection. The results
are summarized in (A) (4) and (B) (3) below.
(A) Testamentary Trusts By hypothesis the grantor (testator) is
not around to be a trustee, beneficiary or power-holder. Hence the
special problems of grantor trusts (discussed below under inter vivos
trusts) are inapplicable. In this connection it should be noted that
a widow electing to accept her husband's will which disposes of her
community property is a grantor to the extent of her interest, 8 and
is proportionately subject to the same limitations as any grantor of
an inter vivos trust.
A beneficiary or fiduciary of a testamentary trust, depending upon
his powers, may be individually subjected to unnecessary taxation.
By this is meant personal tax on income not distributed (or required
to be distributed) to him personally, or on corpus not owned by
him personally.
"
TInt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 673, 2037.
38See Vardell's Estate, 307 F.2d 688 (Sth Cir. 1962) (widow's gross estate included
elective property as transfer with retained life estate, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2036; dic-




(1) Income Tax.-A trustee-beneficiary is personally taxable on
the income of any portion of a trust over which he has power exer-
cisable solely by himself to vest the corpus or income in himself,
39
whether or not he exercises the power. The same would be true of a
beneficiary who had such a power without being trustee. Thus it is
the power rather than the position which generates the tax. On the
other hand, a trustee who is not the beneficiary can be given the
power to vest corpus or income in the beneficiary without imposing
any tax on the beneficiary--except so far as the power is exercised.
Similarly, under a literal reading of the Code a beneficiary may,
without tax, have the power jointly with anyone else (including
another beneficiary)."o Thus it is entirely feasible to use a beneficiary
as trustee without unnecessary tax, either by denying him discretion
to distribute to himself, or by giving such discretion to him and
someone else jointly.
A trustee is not personally taxable merely because he has power
to direct income to someone else. This is so even if the someone is
his dependent, for whose support he is individually obligated. The
typical example is a father who is trustee for his son under a trust
established by the grandfather. However, he is taxable to the extent
that the power is exercised in favor of the dependent."' A non-
trustee with such a power would be worse off: taxed whether or not
it is exercised." This is an unusual situation in which the trusteeship
renders non-taxable a power which would otherwise be taxable, and
thus encourages naming as a trustee the holder of such a power. A
power of this sort held by a third person would precipitate no tax
as long as it went unexercised; but an exercise could constitute a
discharge of the supporter's (e.g., the father's) legal obligation and
thus be taxable to him. 3 There are troublesome questions in deter-
mining the extent of the legal obligation to support," which often
make support trusts rather unattractive from the tax viewpoint,
regardless of the identity of the trustee and regardless of their de-
sirability as a family matter.
No tax results from powers other than those covered by the dis-
cussion above. Thus a power to accumulate income is not taxable.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 678(a) (1). Vesting includes any method by which the
beneficiary can personally enjoy the property, e.g., discretion to distribute income or corpus
to himself, a power of appointment exercisable in his own favor, and a right to terminate
the trust if he is the remainderman.
Treas. Reg. § 1.678(a)-1 (1956).
41Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 678(c).
4
'Treas. Reg. § 1.678(c)-1(b) (1956).
43id. at 5 1.662(a)-4.
"Ibid.
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But powers must be regarded in terms of their substance, not their
labels."5
(2) Estate Tax.-As we have just seen, a power to vest trust in-
come or corpus in himself will subject the holder to income tax. The
same power will subject him to estate tax, but so will the power to
vest in his estate, or in the creditors of himself or of his estate."
The statutory language here shifts to "power of appointment," and
the taxable ones are classed as "general." 47 Here too, it is immaterial
whether the holder of the power is a trustee, so nothing is lost by
naming him one. For example, a marital deduction trust calls for such
a power in the surviving spouse;"' the spouse may as well be a
trustee.49
The broadest power can be used without estate tax consequences
if it is given to someone who cannot exercise it in favor of himself,
etc. Such a power is not taxable to him or to the beneficiary in
whose favor it can be exercised. So far as the tax law is concerned,
it does not matter whether the holder is a trustee. From a trust view-
point, it is obviously desirable to call him a trustee, in order to under-
line his fiduciary obligation with respect to the power.
By special statutory provisions, more limited powers of appoint-
ment can be given a beneficiary (whether or not he is a trustee)
without imposing any estate tax on him, except, of course, to the
extent the powers are exercised and vest him with individual owner-
ship (and except as noted in (d) below). These include:
(a) A power exercisable only in favor of someone besides the
power-holder, his estate, and the creditors of either." This kind of
power can extend to the holder's children and other relatives and is
a valuable element of flexibility in transmitting wealth through
several generations.
(b) A power, even though exercisable in favor of the holder,
which is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to his health,
education, support or maintenance.51
(c) A power, even though exercisable in favor of the holder (or
4 s See note 39 supra.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2041 (a) (2), (b) (1).
"'Ibid. This concept is as broad as in note 39 supra; see Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)
(1961).
41 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (5). See also note 14 in Appendix.
0 In this case, it is important to draft the power so that it is in the spouse individually
and not as trustee. If the latter, the possible resignation or removal of the trustee might
defeat the marital deduction.
50 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041 (a) (2), by negative implication. See Form A, S 5.03
in Appendix.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041 (b) (1) (A). For examples of such powers, see Treas.
Reg. § 20.2041-1(c) (2) (1961).
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his estate, or the creditors of either), which is exercisable only in
conjunction with another person having a substantial adverse interest
in the property, e.g., some other beneficiary."2
(d) A power, even though exercisable in favor of the holder,
which is limited in any one year (non-cumulatively) to $5,000 or
five per cent of the value of the property subject to appointment,
whichever is greater." This power does carry an estate tax burden for
the holder, but it is relatively small: his estate includes the value of
the unexercised power for the current year (i.e., the larger of $5,000
or five per cent).
(3) Combined Effect.-Except to the extent exercised, Powers
(a) and (c) are estate-tax-exempt and should not subject the holder
to income tax, since they do not constitute power (exercisable alone)
to vest in himself.
Power (b) is free from estate tax and should be free from income
tax because of the restrictions on exercise. 4 The power-holder is
safer from income tax if he holds the power as trustee, because of the
fiduciary reinforcement of the restrictions on exercise.
Power (d) will subject the holder to income tax each year only
to the extent of the trust's income included in the $5,000 or five
per cent, and to the extent of any additional income produced by
the corpus to which his power applies.5 He will be subject to estate
tax only on the final year's $5,000 or five per cent.
Where a dependent of the holder is a potential beneficiary of any
of the four limited powers, the holder must be a trustee to escape
both taxes."6
(4) Summary.-Tax factors do not seriously limit the choice of
a testamentary trustee. With careful planning, a beneficiary-trustee
can be given, through powers exempt from both income and estate
taxes, a great deal of discretion-enough to provide the desired
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041 (b)(1)(C) (ii).
I2 ld. at § 2041 (b) (2).
Cf. United States v. DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960). By analogy to Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 678(a), life tenants with power to consume corpus for their "needs,
maintenance and comfort" were not taxable on corpus capital gains. (They were already
taxable on ordinary income because of their right to it.) The standard was a sufficient re-
straint on the exercise of the power.
5 See Ruth W. Oppenheimer, 16 T.C. 515 (1951), 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 3 (1952).
56 See notes 41-3 supra and accompanying text.
Of like importance are the gift tax consequences of powers of appointment. Generally
speaking, the gift tax follows the estate tax, so that the exercise by the power holder in favor
of a third person is a taxable gift if the power is a general one, and is not if the power is
a limited one of any of the kinds described in (a) - (d). See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
2514(b). Since only gifts by individuals are subject to a gift tax, supra, § 2501 (a), the use
of a corporate trustee affords an extra (but usually superfluous) degree of protection in this
area.
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flexibility in most instances. An independent trustee can be given
still more power.
(B) Inter Vivos Trusts The presence of a living grantor complicates
the tax considerations here. He typically wants a major part in the
administration of the trust. How big a part he can have, and how it
affects other parties, we now consider.
(1) Income Tax.-To avoid a lengthy narrative analysis, we tab-
ulate below the main trust powers and interests which make a
grantor taxable or non-taxable on trust income. This condensation
necessarily omits some details and should be used with that in mind.
The powers are arranged in roughly descending order of magnitude.
Correspondingly, the class of persons who may hold them (right-
hand column) generally expands as we go down the list.
However intricate this pattern appears, close inspection reveals
that it has relatively little direct impact on the choice of a trustee.
The reason is that once again the restrictions are upon powers, not
positions. However, there is an important indirect effect: if it is
necessary or desirable that the trustee have a particular power, selec-
tion of the wrong trustee may make the grantor taxable on the trust
income.
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TABLE 1
Powers Taxable and Non-Taxable with Reference to
Grantor's Income Tax ("Clifford Rules")
Type of Power or Interest Income Taxable to Income Not Taxable to
Grantor if Held by- Grantor if Held by-_
1) Reversion"'
2) Revoke and revest in grant-
or
5 8
3) (a) Deal with corpus or in-
come for inadequate con-
sideration or (b) borrow it
without adequate security or
interests'
4) Apply income for grantor's
benefit (including payment
of insurance premiums on
his life) 6
5) Power to control beneficial
enjoyment (subject to ex-
ceptions in 7-9 below)" 5
6) Vote closely held stock or
control investment of trust
with closely held stock"
7) Broad power to control
beneficial enjoyment, i.e.:
(a) To distribute income
among beneficiaries or ac-
cumulate itea
(b) To distribute corpus
among beneficiaries"
(c) To lend income or
corpus to grantor for ade-
quate interest and securi-
ty
6 7
8) Moderate power to control
beneficial enjoyment, i.e.:' °
(a) To distribute income
among beneficiaries
(b) To accumulate it
according to a reasonably
definite external standard
9) Narrow power to control
beneficial enjoyment, in-
cluding, e.g.: '
(a) To distribute corpus
among beneficiaries ac-
cording to a reasonably
definite standard or (if to









consent of adverse party
Anyone in nonfiduciary
capacity without consent







[Adverse party, or gran-
tor and/or non-adverse
party with consent of
adverse party]
[Adverse party, or gran-
tor and/or non-adverse
party with consent of
adverse party]
[Anyone in a fiduciary
capacity, or anyone else





adverse party with con-
sent of adverse party]69
Anyone but grantor or
spouse living with gran-
tor [or either of them
with consent of adverse
party]
Anyone
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TABLE 1 (continued)
ficiary and chargeable to
his share or corpus)
[without any standard]
(b) To distribute income to
a current income benefi-
ciary or accumulate it
temporarily for him
(c) To distribute income to
a beneficiary or accumu-
late it during his disabil-
ity or minority
(d) To allocate receipts and
disbursements b e t w e e n
corpus and income, even
though expressed in broad
language
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 673. There are certain exceptions for reversions after ten
years or after death of a beneficiary.
s8 Id. at § 676. It bears emphasizing that in Texas, contrary to the usual rule, a trust
is revocable by the grantor unless the instrument provides otherwise. Tex. Rev. Civ. Star.
Ann. art. 7425b-41 (1960). To avoid income tax to the grantor, a Texas trust should
specify irrevocability.
'9 Treas. Reg. § 1.676(a) (1) (1956). All statements in brackets are implications from
express statutory provisions. A beneficiary's interest is generally adverse, but the interest
(and its adverseness) may extend only to a fraction of the trust, or to corpus but not
income, or vice versa. For examples, see Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-i (1956), especially (b)-(d).
"°Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 675(1), (2). Borrowing from the trust by the grantor
without adequate interest or security does not make him taxable on the trust income where
a trustee (other than the grantor) has general power to lend to any person without regard
to interest or security. A related provision, included in the table as Power 7(c), permits
loans to a grantor with adequate interest and security, if made by an independent trustee
(defined in note 68, infra.). Id. § 675(3).
6' Id. at § 677.
a2id. at § 674(a).
"'Id. at § 675(4).
64 A trustee is presumed to be acting in a fiduciary capacity. Treas. Reg. 675-1 (b) (4) (iii)
(1956). The presumption is rebuttable only by clear and convincing proof that the power
is not exercisable primarily in the interests of the beneficiaries. A non-trustee may be shown
to be acting in a fiduciary capacity, but the presumption seems to be that he is not. Supra.5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 674(c) (1).
eId. at 5 674(c) (2).
V Id. at 5 675(3); see note 60 supra.
" This means one or more trustees, none of whom is the grantor, and no more than
half of whom are related or subordinate parties who are subservient to the grantor. Ibid.
Related or subordinate parties include the grantor's wife (unless living apart), parents, issue,
siblings, employees, closely held corporations and the employees of such corporations or any
other corporation in which the grantor is an executive. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 672 (c).
Related or subordinate parties are presumed subservient unless the contrary is shown by
a preponderance of the evidence. Ibid. The practical possibility of so showing is much too
slight to rely on in planning.
The related-subordinate category does not include partners, fellow stockholders or other
business associates and friends outside the immediate family or employee groups. Nor does
it include attorneys or accountants unless they are employees or relatives. Such persons can
then be independent trustees as well as a corporate fiduciary (unless, of course, the grantor
happens to have substantial stockholdings in the fiduciary).
'9 Since Power 7 is embraced within Power 5, anyone permitted to hold the latter can
hold the former.
"°Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 674(d).
71 Id. at § 674(b) (5)-(8). The table shows only four of the eight powers permitted by
this section; for the others, see § 674(b) (1) -(4).
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Powers 1-4 in Table 1 are basically unaffected by the identity of
the trustee. The exception is that Powers 2-4, while they cannot
generally" be given to an independent trustee (unless he happens to
be adverse), can be given to a beneficiary (who may, but need not,
also be trustee) if his interest is sufficiently adverse. All this is true
of Power 5, too, except that it is riddled with exceptions (Powers
7-9) considered below.
Power 6 can be safely given only to one in a fiduciary capacity.
For all practical purposes this requires that the holder of the power
(who may be the grantor, a beneficiary or anyone else) be a trustee."
Powers 7 (a) and (b), which are highly prized for the flexibility
they afford in long-term multi-beneficiary trusts, demand an inde-
pendent trustee. This is usually a corporate trustee but may be a
business associate or professional adviser. An independent trustee is
virtually essential, also, if the grantor hopes to borrow from the
trust (Power 7 (c) )."
Powers 8 and 9 have no influence on the selection of the trustee.
Restating these rules by reference to parties, we see: the grantor
can have Powers 2-5 and probably 7-8 (with consent of an adverse
party), 6 (if he is trustee) and 9. A beneficiary can have Powers 2-5
and probably 7 (if he is adverse, or with consent of an adverse
party), 6 (if he is trustee), 8 (if he is not a spouse living with the
grantor) and 9. A related or subordinate party (other than a bene-
ficiary) can have Powers 2-5 (with the consent of an adverse party),
6 (if he is trustee), 8 (if he is not a spouse living with the grantor),
and 9. An independent trustee can have Powers 2-5 (if he is adverse,
or with consent of an adverse party) and 6-9.
In applying these concepts, bear in mind the community property
aspect. Although a husband may create the trust under his mana-
gerial powers, his wife is a grantor, too."
The preceding discussion concerns only the taxability of the
grantor. The beneficiary may be taxed for unexercised powers he
holds to favor himself. The rules are the same as for a testamentary
trust," except that the beneficiary is not taxed if the grantor is.7
(2) Estate Tax and Combined Effect.-There is no exact correla-
72 Power 3 (b) can, however, be given to an independent trustee in certain instances;
see note 60 supra.
73 See note 64 supra.
74 See note 68 supra.
71 See note 60 supra. In some instances, a non-independent trustee will do, so long as
it is not the grantor. Ibid.
71 See also note 38 supra and accompanying text.71 See § 2.3(A) (1) supra.
" Inc. Rev. Code of 1954, S 678(b).
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tion between the estate tax and the income tax. Of the Powers listed
in the previous section, most will precipitate estate tax for the grantor
if held by him at his death. However, in some cases, the estate tax is
less restrictive; in others it is more. Again skipping many refine-
ments:
Power 1 subjects the grantor to estate tax."9
Power 2 is estate-taxable if held by the grantor alone or with any-
one else. s" The income tax exception for consent of an adverse party
is unavailable for estate tax." However, such a power in a non-
adverse party alone would be income-taxable but probably not estate-
taxable.0 2 Any power (by the grantor alone or with anyone else) to
alter or amend the trust is estate-taxable, although it might be too
slight to be income-taxable.
Power 3 is not explicitly dealt with in the estate tax provisions
but would quite possibly be taxable under one or more of the
general ones. a
Power 4 is estate-taxable if held by the grantor. 4
Power 5: same as Power 2.s5
Looking only at the estate tax, Powers 2-5 appear non-taxable if
held by anyone beside the grantor. But, recalling that they are
income-taxable when held by any non-adverse party, we must recog-
nize a remote possibility that the income taxable to the grantor will
be treated as retained income subjecting him to estate tax if the
power is held by a non-adverse party."
Power 6 is not explicitly dealt with in the estate tax provisions
and is probably not taxable. However, it carries some risk of un-
certainty "7 and should be approached with caution."0
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2037(a) (2). There is an exception if its actuarial value is
no more than 5% of the value of the property at death.
sold. at § 2038(a) (1).
S Casner, Eastate Planning 197 (3d ed. 1961).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 2038(a) (1).
83 1d. at 55 2036-2038.
8
4 1d. at 5 2036(a)(1).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 2036(a) (2).
soSee Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 148 (1962) arguing against
this result in the case of an insurance trust. Life insurance is not taxable if the insured
divests himself of all incidents of ownership, even though he continues to pay premiums.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042. Transferring the insurance to an inter vivos trust will
accomplish the divestiture if the grantor (insured) has no incidents of ownership; this bars
him from being trustee, Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(4) (1961). However, if premiums
are paid from the income of the trust, without the consent of an adverse party, the income
is taxable to the grantor and raises the spectre that the corpus of the trust (i.e., the pre-
death cash value of the insurance and possibly even the proceeds at death) will be estate
taxable.
" See Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 149-51 (2d ed. 1962) for
discussion of the uncertain state of the law as to transfers of closely held stock.
: If nothing else, the instrument should specify that the power is to be exercised only
in a fiduciary capacity. See Form E and note 32 in Appendix.
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Powers 7-9 are generally estate-taxable if held by the grantor alone
or with anyone else. s" The income tax exception covering all of
Power 9 (when held by the grantor) is unavailable for estate tax."
The estate tax, unlike the income tax, makes no express exception
for powers limited by definite external standards. However, case
law has recognized an equivalent, applicable, e.g., to Powers 8 (b)
or 9 (a).'
None of the foregoing powers directly affect the choice of a
trustee, so far as the grantor's estate tax is concerned, although they
may do so indirectly." All of them (except of course 1) could
be given to a beneficiary, or to a third party. The holder would not
have to be a trustee, although making him one would strengthen the
inference that he is not a pawn of the grantor. None of the powers
(except possibly 6) can safely be given to the grantor, whether or
not as trustee. Thus, the estate tax bars him from holding powers
which would be all right under the income tax, e.g., 2-5 (with con-
sent of an adverse party) and 9. Similarly, it bars him from the
right to substitute himself for a trustee holding the powers which
would be taxable to the grantor if held directly. 3
It remains to consider the estate tax effects of the various powers
on other holders. As seen in the examination of testamentary trusts,1
4
other power-holders are not estate-taxable unless the powers amount
to general powers of appointment. In general, the latter will include
Powers 5, 7-9 (and perhaps 3) if held by the beneficiary and exer-
cisable in favor of himself, his estate, or the creditors of either.
Their taxability effectively denies him the use of these powers, with
three exceptions: if the standards for their exercise (e.g. powers 8,
9 (a) ) are related to his health, education, support or maintenance,
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2036(a) (2), 2038(a) (1), and perhaps even § 2037.
90 See, e.g., State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959), estate-
taxing the grantor for a combination of powers held by him as co-trustee with a corporate
fiduciary. Included were a broad power to allocate between corpus and income (Power 9(d)),
unusually broad investment powers, and broad powers to make deductions for depreciation,
waste, etc. In addition, there was a generous exculpatory clause. No one alone would have
precipitated the tax, but the aggregate did.
91 See Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Casner, Estate Planning 195-96
(3d ed. 1961); Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 156 n. 41 (2d ed. 1962).
92 There is an indirect impact to the extent that the powers go with the trusteeship and
thus limit the choice of the trustee. For example, a minor's trust designed to be eligible
for the annual gift tax exclusion, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2503(c), virtually that the
trustee have powers of distribution which would render the grantor estate-taxable if he
were trustee.
3 Treas. Reg. 5§ 20.2036-1 (b) (3), 20.2038-1 (a) (3) (1960).
94 Section 2.3 (A) (2) suPra.
" Such standards keep them from being estate-taxable, see § 2.32 (A) (2) (b) supra, but
are unnecessary to keep them from being income-taxable.
[Vol. 19:523
SELECTION OF A TRUSTEE
if they are exercisable only with the joinder of an adverse party,"
or if they meet the five per cent-$5,000 limits." From his own estate
tax viewpoint, he can have Powers 1, 2, 4 and 6 and (if within any of
the three exceptions just mentioned) 3, 5, 7-9. However, the
grantor's income tax considerations effectively require the bene-
ficiary to be a trustee for 6, and require him to be adverse for 2-5
and 7. The grantor's estate tax considerations do not further re-
strict the list. But the beneficiary's own income and estate tax pic-
ture is affected: he is taxable if he can vest income or corpus in
himself." Even if his rights are confined so that he lacks a general
power of appointment, he is partially taxable to the extent he is
relying on the five per cent-$5,000 exception." And his own income
tax situation dictates that he hold as trustee any of the powers that
can operate in favor of his own dependents." Otherwise, the selection
of the trustee is unaffected, except, as always, that he may not safely
be trustee if that position carries powers which would precipitate
unnecessary tax with him as trustee.
A related or subordinate party (other than a beneficiary) can
effectively have Powers 8 and 9. He should be a trustee if the powers
can operate in favor of his own dependents.
A fully independent party as trustee can have any of the Powers
(except of course 1) without causing estate tax to the grantor.
However, to avoid income tax on the grantor, he must be adverse,
or have the consent of an adverse party, to wield Powers 2-5. He
may possess numbers 6-9 freely.
These results are summarized in Table 2.
"oSee § 2.3 (A) (2) (c) supra. Note that the adverse interest must be "substantial." It
must also be adverse to the power holder, even though the latter is adverse to the grantor.97 See § 2.3 (A) (2) (d) supra.
98 See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
" See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
'0o See notes 41-3 supra and accompanying text.
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(3) Summary.-Any reader who has followed this far, whether
or not he concurs in our analysis, should be aghast at the permuta-
tions and overlaps, at the inconsistent terminology and results. The
area cries out for clarification and simplification; there is no policy
justification for its present bewildering patchwork.
Tax factors more seriously limit the selection of a trustee for an
inter vivos trust than for a testamentary one. The grantor must be
ruled out. With careful planning a beneficiary-trustee can be given,
through powers exempt from both income and estate taxes, a fair
amount of discretion, though less than in a testamentary trust. It
may still be enough to provide desired flexibility. If more is needed,
the choice falls on an independent trustee. '
3. COMBINATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Many of the shortcomings of a single trustee can be overcome by
combining two or more persons in various ways. This is particularly
true where each can make a specific contribution through knowledge,
experience or viewpoint. An institution is well-suited to receive,
hold and disburse assets, to handle records, and to perform routine
administration. A trusted business associate may have investment
skills and patterns that are preferred by the grantor. A wise relative
or family friend may be the best man to exercise discretion over
distributions to beneficiaries. They can be combined in a variety of
ways, including (a) co-trustees with divided powers,' (b) one
trustee subject to veto or consent powers in non-trustee advisers, °
(c) one trustee subject to directory or initiatory powers in non-
trustee advisers,"' (d) one trustee with precatory, non-binding con-
sultation of advisers, and (e) an individual trustee with a bank as
agent or custodian for routine matters, such as holding securities and
collecting dividends.
For example, a close friend or relative, as adviser, can be given
discretion over distributions, while administration and management
are left to a corporate trustee.'O' Or, if a trust is to have an interest
in a closely held business, a co-owner of the business can provide
" The critical difference is that a beneficiary can safely have the equivalent of Power
7 in a testamentary trust so long as he is not an eligible beneficiary. In an inter vivos trust,
such a power in a beneficiary makes the grantor taxable on the income, unless the bene-
ficiary's interest is so adverse that it can qualify as Power 5, in which case the beneficiary
probably has an estate-taxable general power of appointment.
... See Form A, §§ 3.01-3.03 and Form E in Appendix. See also, in general, Spindle,
The Wife as Co-Fiduciary, 104 Trusts and Estates 633 (1965).
"' See Form F in Appendix.
's See Form G in Appendix.
'0e See Form A, §5 3.01, 3.03 in Appendix.
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valuable insights but may not want to be bothered with other de-
tails. Giving him control of the business as co-trustee'07 and another
trustee control of the other property might be an ideal combination.
Separate trusts, one for the business interest and another for the re-
maining assets, are another possibility and might save income tax. '
Varying the example a little, consider the father who owns a profit-
able corporation and has two sons who have "grown up" in the busi-
ness and are fully capable of running it after his death. For tax
planning perhaps, the father wishes to keep his stock interest intact
for the sons' lives but let them have full power to manage and con-
trol the business. This might logically be accomplished by giving a
corporate trustee administrative control over the trust, but giving
the sons the right to vote the stock, as co-trustees or otherwise. Or,
to avoid the tax disadvantages of a beneficiary's having power to
distribute income to himself, several beneficiaries can be made co-
trustees, with each denied power over distributions to himself, but
permitted to participate in the decisions as to the others.09
Trust properties in several states might require a lone corporate
trustee to qualify as a foreign corporation. However, this difficulty
can be avoided by employing ancillary corporate trustees in the
foreign states, or by using individual trustees not subject to corporate
qualification procedures. "'
Multiple trustees and advisers also give the benefit of more view-
points and, presumably, more deliberation. However, appointing too
many is likely to invoke the old saw that everybody's business is
nobody's business, and valuable time can be lost if too many persons
must confer. Multiple trustees may mean additional fees and ex-
penses; a corporate trustee is unlikely to cut its fees merely because
someone else also is serving. It will be a rare case where more than
three trustees or advisers are justified.
When co-trustees are appointed, they serve collectively as "the
107 To minimize conflict of interest, the Texas Trust Act provides that while a non-
corporate trustee may retain securities of a corporation of which he is a director, owner,
manager or executive, he may not acquire additional securities; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
arts. 7425b-14, -12 (1960). This restriction can be waived in the trust instrument, art.
7425b-22, and usually should be. See Form A, § 3.01 (14) in Appendix.
.0s See Note, Trust Advisers, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1230, 1238 (1965), suggesting that avail-
able income from the first trust be distributed to the second.
1o9See Form B, § 2.10 in Appendix. Care should be taken to see that the beneficiary
really does not participate in decisions about his own distributions, for the substance, rather
than the formality, is likely to govern if the IRS raises a question.
150 A 1965 amendment to the Texas Trust Act expressly authorizes a Texas trustee to
appoint, remove, and delegate authority to ancillary trustees (individual or corporate) for
out-of-state property. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-25M (Supp. 1965). The pro-
vision is subject to limitations in the trust instrument. Supra, art. 7425b-25 (1960).
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trustee." Unless the instrument or statute provides otherwise, there
must be unanimity of opinion before any action is taken. Costly
delays and paralysis may result. Therefore, it is usually better to
provide for majority rule (as the Texas act does) .. or for designated
trustees to have authority to act alone in specified areas," or in the
event of dispute. The trust may also provide that any trustee has
authority to act in any matter, like a partner or co-independent
executor. However, this produces a risk of inconsistency and is
normally undersirable.
If powers are split or trustees are bound by advisers, it is important
to delineate responsibility clearly and provide proper exculpatory
clauses to relieve one person of responsibility for acts determined
solely by another. " 3
4. THE FINAL CHOICE
Most lawyers regard a corporate trustee as the best choice. This is
natural, since they are conditioned by advertising and expectant of
reciprocal business. But the lawyer needs better reasons than these if
he is to fulfill his duty of advising the client. The decision should
not be automatic but should be made only after careful review of
the alternatives.
If there is to be only one trustee, the preferred choice, after proper
deliberation, will usually be the corporation because of its experience,
skill and permanence. In this case it is often a useful safety valve
to provide that the beneficiaries can substitute another corporation
in case they become dissatisfied.' It will be a rare individual who
can run a sole trusteeship as well as a corporation can, although he
is worth searching for, as he may provide extra privacy and personal
attention.
Differences exist among corporations and these should be studied.
A large trust department probably has more collective wisdom and
experience but may suffer from over-departmentalization. One insti-
tution may have more expertise than another in the field where the
particular trust is to be active.
It should be clear by now that we believe non-corporate parties
have an important contribution to make to many, if not most, trusts.
"' Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 7425b-18A (1960) does so. See also Form B, § 2.08
in Appendix.
" See Form A, §§ 3.01-3.03 in Appendix.
113For examples, see Form A, § 4.03; Forms E-G in Appendix. Similar provision was
made by a 1965 amendment to the Texas act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-25N
(Supp. 1965).
... See § 5.2 infra and Form C in Appendix.
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Sometimes several of them may provide the optimum combination
for the trusteeship. Probably more often, one or more of them should
serve with an appropriate institution, either as co-trustees or as
advisers." 5
If an individual is selected, he should usually be given the power
to appoint a co-trustee to relieve him of routine administration,"'
and he should be authorized to surrender powers." 7 This is advisable
because of the possibility that powers thought not to be taxable to
him turn out to be, either through original error or subsequent
development.
In summary, our recommendations would be as follow, in de-
scending order-assuming high qualifications and no tax drawbacks
in each case:
(1) Several individuals
(2) A corporation and one or more individuals
(3) A corporation
(4) An individual
On the whole, we think it sounder to make second and third
parties co-trustees (with appropriate division of power) rather than
advisers. The legal role of the adviser has not yet been fully de-
veloped in the courts,"8 and this alone is a reason for reticence. More
importantly, (a) if the adviser can make binding determinations,
he is probably a trustee, and failing so to designate him may be
misleading to him and the beneficiaries, and (b) if the adviser is not
acting in some sort of fiduciary capacity, his role is incompatible with
the fiduciary nature of the trust. If he is not named as co-trustee,
the instrument should certainly recite that his powers are to be
exercised in a fiduciary capacity."'
5. THE AFTERMATH
The problems of the trustee's identity do not end with his initial
selection. Possible changes in trustees must be considered. We do
this under the headings of resignation, removal and succession.
5.1 Resignation
Statutory provision is made for resignation of trustees in Texas
in the following language: "Upon petition of any trustee of an ex-
press trust, a court having jurisdiction may accept his resignation, and
... See Forms A, E-G in Appendix.6 See Form D in Appendix.
"17 See Form A, § 3.06 in Appendix.
". Note, Trust Advisers, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1230, 1231-32, 1237 (1965).
See Form E in Appendix. This is a good tax precaution, too; see notes 63-64, 88 supra.
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discharge him from the trust upon such terms and conditions as the
rights of the person interested in the trust may require."'' 0 This pro-
cedure can involve a judicial accounting, which is both slow and
expensive. If more summary, non-judicial provisions for resignation
are desired (and most trustees will want them), they should be in-
cluded in the trust instrument."'
5.2 Removal
A settlor who chooses his trustee carefully may be shocked at the
thought of a removal provision. But individuals do sometimes fail
to live up to expectations, become incompetent through age or disease,
or turn dishonest. Even a corporate trustee may antagonize bene-
ficiaries or deteriorate as an organization. Statutory provision is
made for removal of a trustee for material violation of (or attempt
to violate) the trust, for becoming incompetent or insolvent, and
for other causes in the court's discretion."' It is preferable to furnish
a non-judicial means of removal, although there is always the risk
that a suit will be necessary if there is real antagonism between the
trustee and the beneficiaries. Power of removal will normally be
given to the beneficiaries (subject to the precautions noted in 5.3
below), but may be lodged in others, as with appointment of a
successor."'
5.3 Succession
The Texas Trust Act provides for appointment of a successor
trustee by the court having jurisdiction, on the death of a sole or
surviving trustee.'" This codifies the case law practice that a trust
will not be allowed to fail for want of a trustee. Court-appointed
successor trustees have the same powers, duties and responsibilities as
the original trustee unless the court directs otherwise."' If the grantor
wishes to avoid the publicity and expense of judicial appointment
of a successor, or wants a successor to each of several trustees, he
should provide in the trust instrument for succession. This can be
done in various ways: (a) by naming individuals or organizations in
order of preference, (b) by giving specified persons (identified by
2' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-38 (1960).
... The grantor's power to do so is given by art. 7425b-22. See Form A, S 2.02 in Ap-
pendix.1d. at art. 7425b-39.
"aSee Form C in Appendix and text accompanying note 114 supra. Bear in mind that,
for tax purposes, a person who can remove a trustee and substitute himself, is regarded as
having the powers of the trustee; note 93 supra and accompanying text.




name or by position) the power to designate the successor, perhaps
according to prescribed qualifications.'25 The former is more likely to
carry out the trustor's wishes and is attractive insofar as the wishes
have not become obsolete or irrelevant with the passage of the long
periods that may be involved in a trust. The latter device may be
used to give beneficiaries the power to fill a vacancy, although pre-
cautions must be observed to keep this from causing trouble: (1)
the power should be limited to adult and competent beneficiaries,
to avoid inability to act; (2) a simple majority should be specified,
in order to minimize the chance of deadlock; and (3) the persons
eligible to be chosen under the power should be defined with the
same care as the original trustees, since they have all the same re-
sponsibility and importance for the carrying out of the plan. Ac-
cordingly, it is often desirable to limit this succession power to
corporate trustees of specified size and character. If it comes to this,
the grantor would probably do better to name the corporate trustee
himself. A commonly used alternative is to authorize the senior judge
of the local federal or state court to appoint the successor. This is
usually specified to be in his individual and not his judicial capacity,
to avoid the need for filing petitions, giving notices, and subjecting
the trust to judicial process. It is wise to limit his choice to corporate
trustees of designated size and character.
5.4 The Need For A Record
If resignation, removal and succession are to be non-judicial, some
definitive public record should be made. It can inform and protect
persons dealing with the trust and provide documentation which the
remaining or new trustee can furnish. One simple solution is a pro-
vision in the trust for conclusiveness of filings of such information
in the deed records of a designated county." '
' See Form A, S 2.03 in Appendix.
"'7See Form A, §§ 2.02-2.03; Forms C and D in Appendix.
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APPENDIX
FORM A-LONG-TERM TRUST; CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL TRUSTEES
WITH BROAD, DIVIDED POWERS; DISCRETION TO SPRAY INCOME AND
PRINCIPAL; LIMITED POWER OF APPOINTMENT ON TERMINATION
[Reference: text at notes 103, 106, 115; 65, 50 to the Article]
[Note: this Form is suitable for a testamentary trust and (with changes
indicated in the footnotes) for an inter vivos trust.]
CONTENTS
ITEM ONE: DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS [omitted]
ITEM TWO: TRUSTEES
2.01 Designation of Trustees
2.02 Resignation of Trustees
2.03 Successor Trustees
2.04 Reorganization of Trustee
2.05 Definition of Trustee; Distribution of Powers
2.06 Freedom from Court Supervision
2.07 Compensation and Bond
ITEM THREE: POWERS OF TRUSTEES
3.01 General Powers of Corporate Trustee
3.02 Special Powers of Investment Trustee
3.03 Special Powers of Distribution Trustee
3.04 Records; Inspection
3.05 Annual Report
3.06 Release of Powers by Amendment of Trusts
ITEM FOUR: LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE AND PERSONS DEALING WITH IT
4.01 Persons Dealing with Trustee
4.02 Liability of Trustee
4.03 Liability of Trustee for Acts of Others
4.04 Limitation of Personal Liability of Trustee
4.05 Corporate Trustee
4.06 Judgment and Discretion of Trustees Final
ITEM FIVE: DISTRIBUTIONS; TERMINATION
5.01 Income Prior to Termination
5.02 Principal Prior to Termination
5.03 Termination and Distribution
ITEM ONE: DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS [e.g., bequest or conveyance to Trus-
tees]
ITEM TWO: TRUSTEES
2.01 Designation of Trustees I designate as my Trustees:
(A) [name and address of bank or trust company] ("my Cor-
porate Trustee")
(B) My trusted business associate, [name and address] ("my In-
vestment Trustee") 1
' It is assumed that he is not a beneficiary.
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(C) Our valued family friend, [name and address] ("my Dis-
tribution Trustee").
2.02 Resignation of Trustees' Any Trustee is authorized to resign by
filing a written instrument duly acknowledged in the Deed Records4 of
County, Texas;5 this filing shall immediately deprive the resigning
Trustee of all powers as Trustee hereunder. At least thirty days prior to
such filing, the resigning Trustee shall give written notice thereof of those
persons who could then with or without the exercise of discretion receive
any distribution of income from the trust estate and are then sui juris. No
purchaser from or other person dealing with any Trustee is obligated to
examine such Deed Records, and any such person shall be protected in all
transactions with any Trustee whether or not any such resignation has taken
place.
2.03 Successor Trustees
(A) If my Corporate Trustee fails or ceases to serve for any rea-
son, then the remaining Trustees' may designate as successor Corporate Trus-
tee any national bank in the United States or any state bank or trust company
in County, Texas, having trust powers and a capital and surplus of
$5,000,000 (five million dollars) or more. The designation shall be by writ-
ten instrument duly acknowledged and filed in the Deed Records of such
county. Any designation shall be revocable until the successor has accepted
appointment and entered upon its duties as Trustee; such revocation shall be
in the same form as the original designation.
(B) If my Investment Trustee fails or ceases to serve for any rea-
son, he may (before or within 30 days after he so fails or ceases)' designate
as successor Investment Trustee any individual he thinks suitable for the
position! The designation, and its revocation, shall be as provided in 2.03 (A)
above. If he fails so to designate, the then Corporate Trustee shall be the suc-
cessor Investment Trustee.
(C) If my Distribution Trustee fails or ceases to serve for any
reason, a majority of those persons who could then with or without the ex-
ercise of discretion receive any distribution of income or corpus from the
trust estate and are then sui juris,9 may designate as successor Distribution
" It is assumed that he is not a beneficiary. In an inter vivos trust, it is important that
he be independent; see note 68 to the Article.
a See note 121 to the Article and accompanying text.
4 See text accompanying note 127 to the Article.
Or (if in a will) the county in which I reside at my death.
* Alternatives:
(a) a majority by number of those persons who could then with or without
the exercise of discretion receive any distrbution of income or corpus from
the trust estate and are then sui juris, or (b) the Judge of the Court in which
this Will is probated (acting in his individual and not his judicial capacity),
or (c) the senior Federal District Judge sitting in or for the county where I
reside at my death (acting in his individual and not his judicial capacity).
By specifying the county, all these Alternatives can be used inter vivos. See text accom-
panying note 126 to the Article. Alternative (a) can be further modified by providing that
the beneficiaries shall vote in proportion to their financial interests in the trusts, although
this is practical only if their interests are readily ascertainable. Still another approach is to
give designated beneficiaries (such as a widow) a larger voice in the selection.
'For alternatives, see S 2.03 (A) supra at note 6.
' Where possible, the character requirements of the successor should be spelled out, e.g.,
in terms of profession or age. See § 5.3 of the text.9 For alternatives, see § 2.03 (A) supra note 6.
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Trustee any individual they think suitable for the position." The designation,
and its revocation, shall be as provided in 2.03 (A) above. If they fail so to
designate, the then Corporate Trustee shall be the successor Distribution
Trustee.
2.04 Reorganization of Trustee If a Corporate Trustee should, before
or after qualification, change its name, be reorganized, merged, or consoli-
dated with, or acquired by, any other bank or trust company, or be con-
verted into a different type of bank or trust company, it shall be deemed a
continuing entity and shall continue to act as Trustee or be eligible to be-
come a Trustee, as the case may be.
2.05 Definition of Trustee; Distribution of Powers My Trustee,
whether one or more, whether male or female, whether individual or cor-
porate, whether original, successor or substitute, is herein called Trustee. Ex-
cept as expressly provided otherwise, each Trustee shall have the same duties,
powers and discretions.
2.06 Freedom from Court Supervision It is my intention that so far
as can be legally provided the Trustee shall be completely free of all court
supervision of any kind, including the requirement of any judicial account-
ing.
2.07 Compensation and Bond Any Corporate Trustee shall receive rea-
sonable compensation for services as Trustee but not more than is then cur-
rently being charged for like services by national banks in the vicinity of its
principal office. No individual Trustee shall receive compensation for service
as such.ii No Trustee shall be required to furnish bond or other security.
ITEM THREE: POWERS OF TRUSTEES
3.01 General Powers of Corporate Trustee 2 Except as provided in
3.02 and 3.03 below, the Corporate Trustee shall have the following powers
alone and without the joinder of any other Trustee.
(1) Usual Trust Powers To exercise all powers granted to a Trus-
tee by the common law or any statute, including every power granted to a
Trustee by the "Texas Trust Act," art. 742 5b, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., or
any future amendment thereof which serves to increase the extent of the
powers granted to a Trustee.
'0 See note 8 supra. Consideration should be given to the possibility that a beneficiary
may be chosen; his powers might subject him personally to income or estate tax; see §
2.3 (A) (1) and (2) of the text. Even in this event, S 3.06 infra may provide an escape
hatch if it is timely used. In an inter vivos trust, tax considerations require that the grantor
be made expressly ineligible to succeed to the investment trustee position, for it gives him the
equivalent of Powers 7(a) and 5(b), note 65 to the Article.
" Serious consideration should be given to proper compensation for individual trustees,
particularly if they are not also beneficiaries. See § 2.1 (C) of the text.
" A number of the corporate trustee's powers overlap those of the investment and (to
a lesser extent) the distribution trustees. For example, Powers (2)-(8) and (11)-(17) grant
authority both to make decisions (the investment trustee's bailiwick) and to carry them out
(the corporate trustee's duty). Power (25) contains a similar overlap between the corporate
and distribution trustees. These powers all have been given to the corporate trustee to avoid
the necessity of splitting each into its decision-making and implementing components. As a
result each form may be used where both components are to be held by a single trustee.
Unless the noncorporate trustees are to be extremely active in administering the trust, it
may be better to leave the powers with the corporate trustee. On the other hand, if it is
planned that the noncorporate trustees will be quite active participants, their respective pow-
ers might better be removed from the list of the corporate trustee's powers, leaving in their
place a general power to carry out the decisions made by the others.
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(2) Retention of Trust Estate To retain any property, real,
personal, or mixed, which may from time to time be or become a part of the
trust estate, even though such property (by reason of its character, amount,
proportion to the total trust estate, or otherwise) would not be considered
appropriate for a fiduciary apart from this provision.
(3) Sales or Disposition of Trust Property To sell, exchange,
give options upon, partition, convey, or otherwise dispose of, with or without
covenants (including covenants of warranty of title) any property, which
may from time to time be or become a part of the trust estate, at public
or private sale or otherwise, for cash or other consideration or on credit, and
upon such terms and conditions as the Trustee shall think advisable, and to
transfer and convey the same free of all trusts.
(4) Investment of Trust Property To invest and reinvest the
trust estate from time to time in any property, real, personal, or mixed, in-
cluding (without limiting the generality of the foregoing language) securi-
ties of domestic and foreign corporations and investment trusts or companies,
bonds, debentures, preferred stocks, common stocks, mortgages, mortgage
participations, and interests in common trust funds, all with complete dis-
cretion to convert realty into personalty or personalty into realty or other-
wise change the character of the trust estate, even though such investment
(by reason of its character, amount, proportion to the total trust estate, or
otherwise) would not be considered appropriate for a fiduciary apart from
this provision, and even though such investment causes a greater proportion
of the total trust estate to be invested in investments of one type or of one
business or company than would be considered appropriate for a fiduciary
apart from this provision.
(5) Loans of Trust Property To make loans, secured or unse-
cured, in such amounts, upon such terms, at such rates of interest, and to
such persons, firms, or corporations as the Trustee shall think advisable. 3
(6) Acquisition of Non-productive Property To acquire proper-
ty returning no income or slight income or to retain any such property so
long as the Trustee shall think fit without the same being in any way charge-
able with income or the proceeds thereof in case of sale being in any part
deemed income.14
(7) Improving and Leasing Trust Property To improve any
real estate comprising a part of the trust estate; to demolish any build-
ings in whole or in part, and to erect buildings; to lease real estate or personal
property on such terms and conditions and for such length of time (includ-
ing ninety-nine years or more) as the Trustee shall think fit, even though
such lease may extend beyond the term of the trusts; to foreclose, extend,
renew, assign, release or partially release, and discharge mortgages or other
liens and to accumulate income for the purpose of doing so.
'a See notes 60 and 67 to the Article and accompanying text; § 3.03 (A) infra.
"' In a marital deduction trust add: "However, such property shall not be retained for
an unreasonable period of time without the written consent of my spouse." Alternatively,
in a marital deduction trust, the following may be added, perhaps in part five: "Notwith-
standing any other provision, my spouse shall have such rights over the Trustee as are
necessary to assure that my spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the [Marital
Deduction] trust." Both provisions are intended to implement the requirements of Int. Rev.
Code of 1954 § 2056(b)(5) and Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1961) that the sur-
viving spouse be entitled to all the income for life. The second alternative is the broader
of the two.
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(8) Borrowing Money To borrow money and to execute promis-
sory notes therefor, and to secure such obligations by mortgages or other
liens or pledges of any property of the trust estate; to make any type of pur-
chase or contract, including installment contracts or credit arrangements,
the effect of which is to borrow money; to accumulate income for the pur-
pose of repaying any indebtedness owed by the Trustee.
(9) Adjustment of Claims and Suits; Prepayment of Existing
Mortgage To prosecute or defend any suit; to compromise or arbitrate any
claim (including a claim for taxes) and any litigation, either in favor of or
against the trust estate or the Trustee; to pay claims upon such evidence as
the Trustee shall think sufficient; to prepay all or part of any mortgage on
my home existing at my death.
(10) Employment of Agents To employ such brokers, banks,
custodians, investment counsel, attorneys, and other agents or servants, and
to delegate to them such duties, rights, and powers of the Trustee for such
period as the Trustee shall think fit; to pay such persons reasonable compen-
sation out of the trust estate; all regardless of whether any such person is
(or is a partner or employee of, or is owned by) a beneficiary or trustee.
(11) Nominees To hold any securities or other property of the
trust estate for any length of time in the name of a nominee or nominees
without mention of any trust or fiduciary capacity in any instrument of
ownership.
(12) Insurance To insure any part of the trust estate against
such risks as the Trustee shall think fit, such insurance to be based on market
value or cost and the coverage to be full or partial as the Trustee shall think
fit; to pay the premiums and to collect or adjust the losses. To acquire, hold,
and pay premiums upon insurance upon the life of any person or persons,"
and to exercise any and all rights of ownership thereof. To purchase other
types of insurance or annuities for any beneficiary.
(13) Mineral Contracts and Sales To execute and deliver oil,
gas, and other mineral leases containing such unitization or pooling agree-
ments and other provisions as the Trustee shall think fit; to execute mineral
and royalty conveyances; to purchase leases, royalties and any type of min-
eral interest; to execute and deliver drilling contracts and other contracts,
options, and other instruments necessary or desirable to participate actively
in the oil, gas, or mining business; all of the foregoing may include such
terms, conditions, agreements, covenants, provisions, or undertakings as the
Trustee shall think fit.
(14) Corporations To incorporate any property in the trust
estate; to transfer any such property to one or more corporations for all or
part of their capital stock or other securities (whether or not any Trustee is
also a securityholder, officer, director or manager of such corporation in an
individual, fiduciary or other capacity);"' to participate in the management
of such corporation or any other corporation whose securities are a part of
the trust estate; to dissolve any such corporations or any other corporation
whose securities are a part of the trust estate; to hold or dispose as part of
the trust estate any property received upon such a dissolution; all in such
manner, at or for such times, and on such terms as my Trustee shall think fit.
1' If an inter vivos trust, add "other than the grantor." See note 61 to the Article.
16 See note 107 to the Article.
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(15) Partnerships" To enter into partnerships; to transfer any
property in the trust estate to one or more partnerships for interests in such
partnerships; to act as a partner in any partnership or with respect to any
property, any part of which may be or become part of the trust estate origi-
nally or later; so to act as a partner with himself (or herself or itself) acting
in an individual, fiduciary or other capacity; to participate in the manage-
ment of such partnerships; to dissolve any partnership in which the Trustee
acts as a partner; and to hold or dispose as part of the trust estate any prop-
erty received upon such a dissolution; all in such manner, at or for such
times, and on such terms as my Trustee shall think fit.
(16) Businesses" To continue to operate any business interest
which becomes part of the trust estate; to delegate all or part of the man-
agement thereof; to invest other funds of the trust estate therein; to convert
such business from one form (e.g., proprietorship, partnership, corporation)
to another; all in such manner, at or for such times, and on such terms as
my Trustee shall think fit.
(17) Voting Securities; Reorganizations To vote, in person or
by proxy, any stocks or other properties having voting rights; to enter voting
trusts and voting agreements; to exercise any options, rights, or privileges
pertaining to any property in the trust estate; to participate in any merger,
reorganization, or consolidation affecting the trust estate, and in connection
therewith to take any action which an individual could take with respect to
property owned outright by such individual, including the payment of ex-
penses or assessments, the deposit of stock or property with a protective com-
mittee, the acceptance or retention of new securities or property, and the
payment of such amounts of money as may seem advisable in connection
therewith.
(18) Payment of Expenses and Taxes To incur such expenses or
charges in the management of the trust estate as the Trustee shall think fit;
to render the trust estate for taxes if the Trustee shall think it desirable or
to refuse to do so if the Trustee shall think it undesirable, and to pay taxes,
charges, and governmental assessments against the trust estate; in anticipa-
tion of such expenses, charges, taxes and assessments to set up such reserves
as the Trustee shall think fit.
(19) Reliance on Business Documents To rely upon the au-
thenticity of affidavits, certificates, opinions of counsel, letters, notices, tele-
grams, cablegrams, and other methods of communication in general use and
usually accepted by business men as genuine and what they purport to be.
(20) Acceptance of Additional Property To accept from any
source any property to be held as part of any trust hereunder.
(21) Charitable Contributions To make contributions to edu-
cational, charitable, religious, scientific or literary organizations.
(22) Custody of Trust Estate; Disbursement of Funds To re-
tain sole custody of the trust estate; to keep any of the property of the trust
estate at any place or places in Texas or elsewhere in the United States op
abroad, or with a depository or custodian at such place or places; to make
all disbursements of the trust funds without any counter-signature; to make
17 See note 30 to the Article and accompanying text. It may be desirable to transfer this
power to the investment trustee as described in § 3.02 infra.
's See note 14 supra.
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all reports, including tax returns, to any agency of the government, local,
state or federal.
(23) Execution of Documents To execute and deliver agree-
ments, assignments, bills of sale, deeds, leases, notes, powers of attorney, war-
ranties, covenants, guaranties, receipts, releases, and other papers or docu-
ments reasonably necessary or desirable to carry out the powers granted to
the Trustee or to any one of the Trustees.
(24) Division into Shares or Separate Trusts To hold, manage,
invest, and account for the several shares or separate trusts which may be
held in trust, either as separate funds or as a single fund, as the Trustee shall
think fit; if as a single fund, making division thereof only upon the books
of account and allocating to each share or trust its proportionate part of the
principal and income of the single fund and charging against each share or
trust its proportionate part of the common expenses.
(25) Method of Distribution or Division In dividing the trust
estate into separate shares or trusts or in distributing the same, to divide or
distribute in cash, in kind, or partly in cash and partly in kind, using differ-
ent properties according to their value and/or undivided interests in the same
properties, as the Trustee shall think fit. For any purpose, including division
or distribution, to value the trust estate or any part thereof reasonably and
in good faith, and such valuation shall be conclusive upon all parties.
(26) Powers Under Changed Conditions ' o exercise such other
powers as may be necessary or desirable in the management and control of
the trust estate (whether or not similar to those here enumerated) to enable
the Trustee to act under changed conditions, the exact nature of which can-
not now be foreseen.
3.02 Special Powers of Investment Trustee" Notwithstanding any
other provision, my Investment Trustee, alone and without the joinder of
any other Trustee, shall have such power and discretion over the method of
investment of the trust estate, from time to time. His decisions and direc-
tions in this respect shall be promptly transmitted by him to my Corporate
Trustee, and shall be promptly carried out by my Corporate Trustee.
3.03 Special Powers of Distribution Trustee"° My Distribution Trustee
shall have the following powers alone and without the joinder of any other
Trustee. His decisions and directions in these respects shall be promptly trans-
mitted by him in writing to my Corporate Trustee, and shall be promptly
carried out by my Corporate Trustee.
(A) Certain Transactions with Beneficiaries" To make loans
(secured or unsecured) to, to buy property from, and to sell property to:
(1) Any Trust beneficiary,
(2) The estate of any beneficiary (whether living or dead),
or
(3) A trust created by or for the benefit of any beneficiary
(whether living or dead).
(B) Apportionment of Income and Expense To determine with
finality, as to each sum of money or other thing of value held or received by
any Trustee, whether and to what extent the same shall be deemed to be
19 See note 12 supra.
20 See note 12 supra.
21 Compare notes 60, 67 to the Article and 13 supra and accompanying text.
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principal or to be income, and as to each charge or expense paid or loss in-
curred by the Trustee, whether and to what extent the same shall be charged
against principal or against income, including (without hereby limiting the
generality of the foregoing language) power to apportion any receipt or dis-
bursement between principal and income and to determine what part, if any,
of income is available for distribution according to the terms hereof and what
part, if any, of the actual income received upon a wasting investment or upon
any security purchased or acquired at a premium shall be returned and added
to principal to prevent a diminution of principal upon exhaustion or maturity
thereof; and to set up such reserves out of principal or income as the Trustee
shall think fit.2
(C) Allocation of Deductions To allocate between any trust and
any one or more income beneficiaries, as my Trustee shall think fit, any de-
pletion, depreciation or other apportionable deduction under the federal in-
come tax. In allocating such deductions, or in designating the source of any
income distributed or accumulated, the Trustee may take into consideration
the respective income tax benefits available therefrom to the various benefici-
aries and to the Trustee from information known or furnished to the Trustee.
(D) Discretion to Accumulate Income or Corpus or Distribute
Corpus To exercise the discretion given by paragraphs 5.01 and 5.02 to
accumulate or distribute income and to distribute principal of the Trust.
(E) Occupancy of Trust Property To allow any beneficiary to
use or occupy trust property without payment of rent.
3.04 Records; Inspection The Corporate Trustee shall keep accurate
and complete records of Trust transactions. Any beneficiary (or his repre-
sentative authorized in writing) may inspect the records at any reasonable
time.
3.05 Annual Report The Corporate Trustee shall make an annual re-
port in writing to each living beneficiary who could in the discretion of the
Trustee receive any income or distribution from the trust estate during that
year.
3.06 Release of Powers by Amendment of Trusts Any Trustee shall
have power and authority to amend the provisions of the trust in order to
surrender, release, renounce or disclaim (either absolutely or in favor of the
Corporate Trustee) any one or more of the discretionary powers given to
that Trustee. Any such amendment shall be made by written instrument
acknowledged and filed in the Deed Records of the County where I reside at
my death.' After any power has been so surrendered, released, renounced or
disclaimed, it shall never again be exercised by that Trustee.
ITEM FOUR: LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE AND PERSONS DEALING WITH IT
4.01 Persons Dealing with Trustee No purchaser from or other person
dealing with the Trustee shall be responsible for the application of any pur-
chase money or other thing of value paid or delivered to any Trustee, but the
receipt of any Trustee shall be a full discharge. No purchaser from or other
person dealing with any Trustee and no issuer, transfer agent or other agent
of any issuer, of any securities to which any transaction with any Trustee
22 This paragraph of powers is often better left to the corporate trustee because of the
bookkeeping details. See also note 90 to the Article and note 12 supra.2 For inter vivos trust, specify the county.
[Vol. 19:523
SELECTION OF A TRUSTEE
shall relate, shall be under any obligation to ascertain or inquire into the
power of the Trustee to transfer, pledge, or otherwise in any manner dispose
of or deal with any securities or other property comprising part of the trust
estate.
4.02 Liability of Trustee No Trustee shall be responsible or liable for
any loss which may occur by reason of depreciation in value of the properties
at any time belonging to the trust estate, nor for any other loss which may
occur, except that each Trustee shall be liable for his own negligence, neg-
lect, default or willful wrong.
4.03 Liability of Trustee for Acts of Others No Trustee shall be liable
or responsible for the acts, omissions or defaults of any agent or other person
to whom duties may be properly delegated hereunder (except officers or regu-
lar employees of any Trustee) if such agent or person was appointed with
due care. No Trustee shall be liable or responsible for failure to contest the
accounts of any other Trustee, or otherwise to compel any other Trustee to
redress any breach of trust, unless in writing requested to do so by a benefi-
ciary or a guardian or guardian ad litem thereof. No Trustee shall be liable
or responsible for any act within the sole power and discretion of any other
Trustee."
4.04 Limitation of Personal Liability of Trustee No Trustee shall in-
cur any personal liability to any person or corporation dealing with any
Trustee in the administration of the trust estate, and each Trustee shall be
entitled to reimbursement from the trust estate for any liability, whether in
contract or in tort, incurred in the administration of the trust estate in ac-
cordance with the provisions hereof, and each Trustee may contract in such
form that he shall be exempt from such personal liability and that such li-
ability shall be limited to the trust estate.
4.05 Corporate Trustee The powers and authorities granted to the
Trustee shall not be limited by the fact that a Trustee is a bank or financial
institution, and no trustee shall be subject to limitations or restrictions im-
posed upon a bank or financial institution or upon fiduciaries generally with
respect to the type of investment any such Trustee may make of its own
funds or of the funds of others. Specifically, the Trustee may (A) retain,
acquire, or otherwise deal in the capital stock or other securities of a Trustee
or of a corporation for which a Trustee is registrar, transfer agent, or the
like; (B) deposit trust funds with a Trustee as a bank, and (C) contract
or otherwise enter into transactions with a Trustee as a bank or any of its
affiliates or any other trust for which it is acting as Trustee.
4.06 Judgment and Discretion of Trustees Final Wherever the judg-
ment or discretion of any Trustee may be exercised, it shall be final and bind-
ing upon every person interested in the trust estate. Any Trustee exercising
any discretionary power relating to the distribution or accumulation of prin-
cipal or income or to the termination of any trust shall be responsible only
for lack of good faith in the exercise of such power.
ITEM FIVE: DISTRIBUTIONS; TERMINATION
5.01 Income Prior to Termination My Trustee may, from time to
time, distribute the income of the trust estate (or may accumulate any or
24 See text accompanying note 113 to the Article.
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all of it, and may later distribute any or all accumulated income) in such
amounts as my Trustee in his discretion thinks appropriate, to any one or
more of the following persons [beneficiaries designated by name or class]."'
5.02 Principal Prior to Termination My Trustee may, from time to
time, distribute any or all the principal of the trust estate in such amounts
as my Trustee in his discretion thinks appropriate, to any one or more of
the following persons [beneficiaries designated by name or class; need not be
same as in 5.01].
5.03 Termination and Distribution My Trust shall terminate on the
death of the last to die of the persons named or described in 5.01 above.
Thereupon the principal and undistributed income of the trust estate shall
be distributed in such amounts to such persons as such last to die shall ap-
point by a will which specifically refers to this power of appointment. This
power shall never be exercisable in favor of the estate, the creditors, or the
creditors of the estate of myself or of such last to die.2" If such last to die
fails so to appoint, the principal and undistributed income shall be distributed
to my heirs at law and next of kin (as if I had died at the time of such
termination) according to the laws of descent and distribution then in force
in Texas."
FORM B-PROVISIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL Co-TRUSTEES; MAJORITY RULE
[Reference: text section 4 and notes 109, 111; 39, 46 to the Article]
ITEM ONE: DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS [omitted]
ITEM Two: TRUSTEES
2.01 Designation of Trustees I designate as my Trustees
, and 28
2.02 [Same as in Form A]
2.03 Successor Trustees If all my Trustees fail or cease to serve for
any reason, I" designate as my Trustee [name and address of individuals or
bank or trust company].
2.04 - 2.07 [Same as in Form A]
2.08 Majority Rule When three or more Trustees are qualified and
acting, all powers and discretions granted to the Trustees shall be exercised
by a majority."0 When fewer than three are acting, all powers and discretions
shall be exercised only by unanimous action.
2.09 Absence; Incapacity; Delegation If an individual Trustee (A)
23 If an inter vivos trust, the grantor should be excluded. See note 61 to the Article and
accompanying text. So, perhaps, should be his dependents, since he is taxable on amounts
actually distributed for their support; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 677(b). See also notes
41-43 to the Article and accompanying text concerning dependents of other persons.
"This is one of several kinds of limited powers of appointment; see text accompanying
note 50 to the Article.
" The above trustee provisions do not necessarily give a complete picture. For example,
provision for payments to incapacitated persons or for a spendthrift clause may be needed.
If an inter vivos trust, irrevocability should be specified. See note 58 to the Article.
" If inter vivos, the grantor should be excluded; see § 2.3 (B) of the text. In any case,
the trustees' relation to the grantor and to their powers affect their taxes, see, e.g., 55
2.3, 2.3 (A) (3), 2.3 (B) (2) of the text (especially § 2.3 (A) (3)).
'9 For alternatives, see Form A, § 2.03 supra.
30 See note 111 to the Article.
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is at any time absent from the State of Texas, or (B) is mentally or physical-
ly incapacitated to perform his duties or (C) by an instrument in writing,
delegates his powers and duties to one or more other Trustees, such individual
need not resign or be removed. In any such event, the other Trustees shall ex-
ercise all the powers and discretions and perform all the duties of such Trustee
as if he had died and had no successor. Such individual shall not be liable for
any actions taken during such period. Any person dealing with the other
Trustees shall be protected in all respects upon receiving a written statement
from the other trustees of such absence, incapacity or delegation. On the
termination of such absence, incapacity or delegation, such individual shall
resume his position as Trustee."
2.10 Limitation on Power in Respect of Self Notwithstanding any
other provision, no Trustee shall determine (or participate in the determina-
tion) (A) whether income to which he may be entitled as a beneficiary shall
be accumulated or distributed, or (B) whether principal or accumulated in-
come shall be distributed to him as a beneficiary."2
ITEM THREE: POWERS OF TRUSTEES
3.01 Powers [Combining 3.01 - 3.03 of Form A]
3.02 - 3.03 [Based on 3.04 and 3.05 of Form A, with appropriate
modifications]
3.04 [Same as 3.06 of Form A]
FORM C-PowER IN BENEFICIARIES TO REMOVE ONE CORPORATE TRUSTEE
AND SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER
[Reference: text at notes 114, 123 to the Article]
At any time or times, a majority of those persons who could then with or
without the exercise of discretion receive any distribution of income or cor-
pus from the trust estate, may remove (with or without cause) any Cor-
porate Trustee and substitute therefor any national bank in the United States
or any bank or trust company in County, Texas, having
trust powers and a capital or surplus of $ or more.
The removal and substitution shall be by written instrument, duly acknowl-
edged and filed in the Deed Records of County, Texas. The
substitution shall be revocable until the successor has accepted appointment
and entered upon its duties as Trustee; such revocation shall be in the same
form as the substitution. At least thirty days prior to any effective date speci-
fied in the removal and substitution, written notice shall be given to the
Trustee being removed and the Trustee being substituted.
FORM D-PoWER OF INDIVIDUAL TRUSTEE (S) TO DESIGNATE A CORPORATE
Co-TRUSTEE
[Reference: text at note 116 to the Article]
My individual Trustee(s) may at any time designate as co-trustee any na-
tional bank in the United States or any state bank or trust company in
County, Texas, having trust powers and a capital and sur-
81 More detailed provisions on recovery of capacity may be desired.3
2See notes 39, 46 and 109 to the Article.
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plus of $ or more. Such designation shall be by written
instrument, duly acknowledged, and filed in the Deed Records of such Coun-
ty, and promptly delivered to the designated co-trustee. Any designation
shall be revocable until the Corporate Trustee has accepted appointment and
entered upon its duties as Trustee; such revocation shall be in the same form
as the original designation. Such designation may delegate, in whole or in
part, any or all of the powers and discretions given to my Trustee(s)."
FORM E-VOTING RIGHTS IN Co-TRUSTEE OR ADVISER
[Reference: text at notes 63, 64, 88, 113, 115, 119 to the Article]
All voting or other rights relating to securities which are at any time part
of the trust estate shall be exercised solely by
as co-trustee. 4 My Corporate Trustee shall be free from all liability and re-
sponsibility with regard to such exercise.
FORM F-TRUSTEE TO CHANGE INVESTMENTS ONLY ON CONSENT
OF ADVISER
[Reference: text at notes 104, 113, 115 to the Article]
My Trustee shall not make any change in the investments of the trust
estate s without the written consent of my trusted adviser, [name]. My
Trustee shall promptly notify my adviser in writing of any proposed change,
and my adviser shall promptly reply in writing whether or not he consents
to such proposed change. My Trustee shall have no responsibility or liability
for investments changed pursuant to such consent, or not changed pursuant
to a denial of such consent. This provision shall be of no effect on the death
or incapacity of my adviser.a6
FORM G-TRUSTEE TO INVEST ACCORDING TO ADVISER'S DIRECTION
[Reference: text at notes 105, 113, 115 to the Article]
My Trustee shall invest the trust estate in such securities as my trusted
adviser [name] shall from time to time direct. No investment or purchase
shall be made without the written directions of my adviser. Nothing herein
shall prevent my Trustee from applying to my adviser for directions, nor
require my Trustee to do so. The Trustee shall have no responsibility or li-
ability for investments other than to carry out such written directions. This
provision shall be of no effect on the death or incapacity of my adviser.3'
" Useful additions: power of removal (see Form C) and protection of third persons (see
Form A, § 2.02, last sentence).
"4 Alternative: acting in a fiduciary capacity.
" Alternative: limit to designated investments, such as closely held stock.
" Alternative: provision for successor adviser; cf., Form A at notes 6-7 supra. Consider
adding language like Form A, § 3.01 (14) at note 16 supra.
"' Alternative: provision for successor adviser; see Form A at notes 6-7 supra. Consider
adding language like Form A, § 3.01 (14) at note 16 supra.
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